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Abstract 
Based on a McFadden-type conditional logit (CL) discrete choice model, this paper estimates 
the most economic subsidy level (MESL) for room air conditioners (RACs) in China that 
minimizes the net cost of subsidy per unit of electricity saved. The analysis reveals that, 
given the current price and efficiency spectrum of RACs in the Chinese market as well as the 
electricity price and cooling demand of Chinese households, the MESL for RACs in China 
should be around 60%, which is much higher than the current subsidy level of 5-15%. A 
sensitivity analysis suggests that the high MESL (60%) is mainly a consequence of relatively 
low electricity price and household cooling demand in the country. If China’s household 
cooling demand increases further and its electricity price were to rise to a higher level, the 
MESL for RACs could possibly drop to about 5-15%. As household cooling demand varies 
among Chinese cities in different climatic zones and at different levels of economic 
development, the RAC subsidy incentives should be region-specific. With necessary 
modifications, the method for analysis proposed in this paper can also be applied to other 
household appliances to prioritize the types of appliances requiring subsidies. 
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1. Introduction 
Room air conditioners (RACs) account for about 12-15% of electricity consumption in urban 
Chinese households (THUBERC, 2013; Zheng et al., 2014a). This share may increase 
significantly in the near future with rising affluence and rapid improvement in living 
standards. For examples, this may result in longer RAC use time in summers, lower indoor 
temperature settings, and higher RAC ownership in households. Considering the heavy 
dependence of China’s power generation on coal (about 78%) (NBSC, 2015), promoting the 
wider use of efficient RACs is an important means of reducing the nation’s enormous 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and other air pollutants, such as SO2, NOx and PM. 
The Chinese government has mainly adopted two types of policy incentives to promote the 
diffusion of efficient RACs, namely energy efficiency standards and labeling (EES&L) 
schemes and subsidy incentives. The mandatory EES&L scheme for RACs was first 
established in China in 2005, and along with technology advances the related efficiency 
standards have been revised (Energy Label, 2016). China’s EES&L scheme for RACs was set 
for three levels, namely Tier-3, Tier-2 and Tier-1 ranging from low to high efficiency. With 
this mandatory EES&L scheme, RACs with energy efficiency below the stipulated Tier-3 
level are prohibited from sale in the Chinese market. Meanwhile consumers are provided with 
key energy use information of RACs that enable them to make better purchase decisions. 
However, the purchase of efficient RACs by Chinese consumers has often been found to be 
hindered by the associated high upfront cost as well as by consumers’ income constraints 
(Watanabe & Kojima, 2016; Zhao et al., 2012).  
To address these financial barriers, the Chinese government has designed several rounds of 
subsidy incentives for efficient RACs to correct for market failures. The earliest RAC subsidy 
program in China can be traced back to the year of 2009. Two programs were launched in 
that year. One was called “Replacing the Old with the New”. Under this program, a subsidy 
equivalent to 10% of RAC retail price with a cap of 350 Chinese Yuan/unit was provided to 
potential consumers once they returned their old RACs to certain recycling stations. The 
other program was the “Home Appliance to Rural Areas”, under which the government 
exempted 13% of the value added tax (VAT) for selected RAC models if they were sold to 
rural households (Watanabe & Kojima, 2016). Although these two programs were primarily 
aimed at expanding domestic sales of household appliances to counter the country’s declining 
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exports due to the “2008 global financial crisis”, they did promote the use of efficient RACs 
in Chinese households to some extent.  
In June 2012, the first-ever large-scale subsidy program covering five types of popular 
household appliance, namely RACs, refrigerators, TVs, washing machines and water heaters, 
was launched by the Chinese central government (the National Development and Reform 
Commission). This one-year program had a total budget of about 25.6 billion Chinese Yuan 
(4 billion USD). The subsidy levels for efficient RACs, namely Tier-1 and Tier-2 models, 
were set at about 5-7% of their retail prices at that time (see Table 1) (CLASP, 2013). 
According to the Ministry of Finance of China (MOF, 2013), during that one-year period 
about 65 million units of these appliances were purchased and this resulted in a total 
consumer expense of about 250 billion Chinese Yuan. The monthly sales of efficient models 
of these five appliances increased significantly from 1.6 million units in June 2012 to 7.0 
million units in May 2013. 
Table 1:  China’s 2012-2013 subsidy program for efficient RACs 
Cooling capacity (CC)  
Subsidies  (Chinese Yuan/unit) 
Fixed-Speed RACs Viable-Speed RACs 
Tier-1 Tier-2 Tier-1 Tier-2 
CC ≤ 4,500 W 240 180 300 240 
4,500 W < CC ≤ 7,100 W 280 200 350 280 
CC > 7,100 W 330 250 400 330 
Note: the energy efficiency tiers of RACs are stipulated in the national standards of GB12021.3-2010 
(fixed-speed type) and GB21455-2013 (variable-speed type). 
(Source: CLASP, 2013) 
 
In November 2015, the Beijing city government announced a separate three-year subsidy 
program for household appliances, including RACs, TVs and refrigerators, for its jurisdiction, 
which is effective from November 27, 2015 to November 30, 2018. With a cap of 800 
Chinese yuan/unit (about 120 USD/unit), the subsidy levels that are measured as a percentage 
of appliance retail prices were set at 13% for Tier-1 models and 8% for Tier-2 models for all 
the types of appliances covered by the policy (Xinhua News, 2015). Inspired by the initiatives 
of Beijing city, more Chinese cities and provinces are planning to issue their own subsidy 
incentives for household appliances.   
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From the above brief retrospective, it is evident that the RAC subsidy levels designed by the 
Chinese governments have usually been set within the range of 5-15% of products’ retail 
prices. It has been argued that these levels are too low to be effective in practice (TOP10, 
2012). A study by Wang et al. (2017) using structural equation modeling to analyze China's 
2012-2013 subsidy policy for energy-efficient appliances found that it “has no significant 
effect on Chinese residents’ purchase behavior.” Sun et al. (2014a) further suggest that 
“subsidizing less energy-efficient air conditioners may attract consumers away from more 
efficient models.”   
There are also some existing studies on subsidy programs for other household appliances. For 
example, in a study of China’s subsidy programs to biogas digesters (about 50% of the 
construction cost) for rural households, Sun et al. (2014b) point out that “the net effect of the 
current subsidy policy on rural household biogas use was near-negligible.”  By examining 
China’s subsidy program for solar water heaters (SWH), Ma et al. (2014) observe that the 
applied subsidy level (13% of the purchase cost) is too low, and “has failed to significantly 
enhance the deployment of SWHs”. Galarraga et al. (2013), in a study that assessed the 
subsidy program for dishwashers in Spain, have argued that such programs could even 
generate some welfare losses when used in isolation.  
This research aims to evaluate such arguments regarding the effectiveness of subsidy 
programs by using the RACs in China as a case study, and focuses particularly on two 
research questions. First, how can the cost-effectiveness of subsidy incentives for household 
appliances (like RACs) be assessed? Second, are the currently set subsidy levels of 5-15% for 
RACs in China cost-effective when applying the method of analysis proposed here?  
Subsidies can help reduce the upfront cost of efficient appliances for consumers, and improve 
the adoption rates of such appliances (de la Rue du Can et al., 2014). Therefore, to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of subsidy incentives and identify the most economic subsidy level, it is 
essential to model consumers purchase decisions for different appliance alternatives. In the 
U.S., the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) models consumer choices based on a McFadden-type discrete choice model (EIA, 
2013a). Although there are some shortcomings of this type of choice model, the McFadden 
discrete choice model is still widely recognized and used as a standard approach to 
quantitatively represent consumers’ appliance purchase decisions in many globally prominent 
energy-economy models such as NEMS and MARKAL (Min et al., 2014; Kannan et al., 
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2007). In this paper, we propose a quantitative method for estimating the most economic 
subsidy level (MESL) for RACs in China, based on a McFadden-type discrete choice model.   
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 McFadden-type discrete choice model 
Modeling consumer choices for household appliances has always been a crucial part of 
residential energy consumption studies. Among the existing binary and multinomial 
consumer choice models, the McFadden-type discrete choice model has been viewed as the 
most widely-used one (Train, 2009). In this research, a conditional logit (CL) McFadden-type 
choice model is adopted to represent consumers’ RAC purchase decisions. This model 
assumes that there is no correlation in unobserved attributes over RAC alternatives, and the 
utility for each alternative is only related to attributes of that alternative. The standard form of 
the CL model is presented below (McFadden, 1974; Train, 2009): 
ܷ௞ ൌ ܼ௞ ൅ ߝ௞ ൌ ߚܺ௞ ൅ ߝ௞                                   (1) 
௞ܲ௧ ൌ ௘
ሺഁ೉ೖ೟ሻ
∑ ௘ሺഁ೉ೕ೟ሻ಻ೕసభ
                                                   (2) 
where “Uk” denotes consumer utility from alternative “k”; “Zk” is the representative utility 
from alternative “k” given that not all attributes that affect consumer preference are 
observable; “ᆅk” represents unobservable utility of alternative “k” to the analyst, which is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.); “Xk” stands for observable 
attributes of alternative “k” as well as consumer characteristics; “β” is the scale parameter 
that accounts for the magnitude of observed consumer utility; “Pkt” stands for the probability 
of a consumer choosing alternative “k” at time “t”; “J” represents the total number of 
alternatives. 
2.2 Methodology for cost-effectiveness analysis of RAC subsidy incentives 
The core of applying the conditional logit discrete choice model lies in structuring the 
consumer utility function. In this study, the utility function used in the U.S. EIA’s NEMS 
model is adopted as follows (EIA, 2013a): 
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ܺ௞ ൌ 	߱ଵ ∗ ܫܥ௞ ൅ ߱ଶ ∗ ܱܥ௞                                 (3) 
ఠభ
ఠమ ൌ
௥
ଵିሺଵା௥ሻష೜                                                     (4) 
ܣܴ௞ ൌ 	 ௘
ഁ೉ೖ
∑ ௘ഁ೉ೕ಻ೕసభ
                                                  (5) 
where “ICk” and “OCk” respectively stand for the initial cost and annual operating cost of 
alternative “k”; “ω1” and “ω2” represent the weights for the two costs, and the ratio of the two 
weights are determined by the annualizing factor; “r” denotes consumer discount rate; “q” is 
the typical lifetime of RACs, usually 8-10 years in China; “ARk” stands for the adoption rate 
of alternative “k” among consumers; “β” is a scale parameter that represents coefficients of 
the observable attributes of alternative “k”; “J” represents the total number of RAC 
alternatives available in the market. 
The initial cost and annual operating cost of RACs in China are calculated using Equations 6-
7: 
ܫܥ௞ ൌ ܴ ௞ܲሺ1 െ ܷܵܤ௞௅೔ሻ                                   (6) 
ܱܥ௞ ൌ ஼௅ଷ.଺	ൈ஼ை௉಼ ௘ܲ                                            (7) 
where “RPk” stands for the average retail price of RAC alternative “k” (USD/unit); “ܷܵܤ௞௅೔” 
is the subsidy level of “ܮ௜” for alternative “k” (a range of 5%-95% is tested in this study); 
“CL” denotes the cooling load for one unit RAC in Chinese households (MJ/unit·year), which 
is estimated based on surveyed household cooling load (MJ/m2·year), average household 
floor area (m2/household), and the ownership of RACs (units/household) in Chinese 
households; “COPk” stands for the coefficient of performance (W/W) of alternative “k”, 
namely “Energy Efficiency Ratio (EER)” for fixed-speed RACs and “Seasonal Energy 
Efficiency Ratio (SEER)” for variable-speed RACs; “Pe” represents the electricity price 
(USD/kWh).  
The amount of electricity saved from the implementation of RAC subsidy incentives can then 
be estimated from Equations 8-10: 
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ܧܥ௕௔௦௘ ൌ ∑ ܵܣܥ௧ ∗ ܣܴ௞௅బ ∗ ஼௅ଷ.଺஼ை௉ೖ
௃
௞ୀଵ                                (8) 
                         ܧܥ௅೔ ൌ ∑ ܵܣܥ௧ ∗ ܣܴ௞௅೔ ∗ ஼௅ଷ.଺஼ை௉ೖ
௃
௞ୀଵ                                      (9) 
ܧܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟,௅೔ ൌ ൫ܧܥ௕௔௦௘ െ ܧܥ௅೔൯ ∗ ሺ1 െ ߮ሻ                               (10)  
where “ECbase” is the electricity consumption (kWh) of all RACs without subsidy incentives 
(the subscript “L0” representing no subsidy incentives); “ܧܥ௅೔” denotes the electricity 
consumption (kWh) of all RACs under the subsidy incentive “Li”; “SACt” stands for the total 
RAC sales (units) at time “t”; “ܧܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟,௅೔” means the actual energy savings (kWh) after 
considering the rebound effects of the use of efficient RACs by households under the subsidy 
incentive “Li”; “φ” denotes the rebound coefficient. 
Energy efficiency gains usually lead to a lower price for energy services, which in turn can 
result in direct rebound effects on energy consumption. For example, people may 
intentionally use a high-efficiency air conditioner longer than they previously did a low-
efficiency one because of lower operating cost. The scale of direct rebound effects can be 
expressed by a rebound coefficient “φ” (Ouyang et al., 2010), which is defined as the ratio of 
reduced energy savings to expected (or calculated) energy savings. A higher coefficient “φ” 
means a larger rebound effect. 
The total subsidies (“ܷܶܵܤ௅೔”, USD) provided to RAC buyers under the incentive “Li” can be 
calculated by Equation 11: 
ܷܶܵܤ௅೔ ൌ ∑ ܵܣܥ௧ ∗ ܣܴ௞௅೔ ∗ ܴ ௞ܲ௃௝ୀ௞ ∗ ܷܵܤ௞௅೔                                   (11)  
Given the values of “ܧܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟,௅೔”, “ܷܶܵܤ௅೔”, “ܲܩ௘” (i.e., the electricity price gap in China 
with and without government subsidies in USD/kWh) and “q” (i.e., the typical lifetime of 
RACs), the cost-effectiveness of the RAC subsidy incentives (“ܵܲܥܧ௅೔”, USD/kWh) can be 
evaluated as follows: 
ܵܲܥܧ௅೔ ൌ 	
ሺܷܶܵܤ௅೔ െ ݍ ∗ ܧܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟,௅೔ ∗ ܲܩ௘ሻ ݍ ∗ ܧܵ௔௖௧௨௔௟,௅೔൘                (12) 
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It is worth noting that in Equation 12, the net subsidy values are applied. The net subsidies 
are calculated by excluding the avoided electricity subsidies from the total appliance 
subsidies provided by governments because of electricity savings. 
Using the McFadden-type conditional logit discrete consumer choice model, Equations 3-12 
offer a quantitative method of assessing the cost-effectiveness of subsidy incentives for RACs 
in China. The cost-effectiveness is measured as the net subsidies required for achieving one 
unit of electricity saved (USD/kWh). This method is also applicable to other household 
appliances with necessary modifications.  
It can be seen that the cost-effectiveness of RAC subsidy incentives is closely related to four 
key exogenous factors, namely the household cooling load intensity “CL”, the electricity 
price “Pe”, the implicit (or subjective) discount rate used by consumers “r”, and the rebound 
coefficient “φ”. In this study, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for these four factors (see 
Section 4.2). 
 
3. Data collection 
3.1 Room air conditioner use and market in China 
From 2010 to 2013, the annual RAC sales volume in China (mostly split-type) was about 
42.8 million units on average (Tencent News, 2014). Of these, around 85% were sold to 
urban households. The ownership of RACs in Chinese households increased significantly 
during the recent years (see Figure 1). In 2012, the penetration rates were about 126.8 and 
25.4 units per one hundred households in urban and rural China, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Ownership of RACs in Chinese urban and rural households 
(Source: NBSC, 2005-2014) 
 
Owing to unavailability of data on cooling load intensity (MJ/m2·year) in rural Chinese 
households, this paper focuses particularly on the substantial urban RAC market in China. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2014 (NBSC, 2015), the average family size and 
per capita floor space in urban China was about 2.87 persons/household and 32.7 m2/capita 
respectively. 
There are currently two basic types of RACs in the Chinese market: fixed-speed air 
conditioners (FSAC), and variable-speed (i.e., inverter) air conditioners (VSAC). The 
compressors of FSACs can operate only at a certain single speed no matter what the cooling 
load levels are. In contrast, the VSAC compressors are able to match system capacity to the 
actual cooling loads. Accordingly, compared to the FSACs, the VSACs always have 
relatively higher energy efficiency in operation.  
The energy efficiency of FSACs and VSACs are stipulated in the Chinese national standards 
of GB 12021.3-2010 and GB 21455-2013 respectively (Energy Label, 2016). As stipulated 
by these standards, the efficiency measurement for FSACs and VSACs are the “Energy 
Efficiency Ratio (EER)” and “Seasonal Energy Efficiency Ratio (SEER)” respectively. The 
“EER” is defined as the ratio of output cooling energy to input electrical energy, while the 
“SEER” is measured in a different way which is the total cooling output divided by total 
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electric energy input during a typical cooling season. The EES&L schemes for RACs in 
China are shown in Table 2. It is, however, worth noting that the “EER” and “SEER” cannot 
be directly compared because of the use of different testing methods for them. According to 
research by Xu & Liao (2008), the “EER” of FSACs would increase by about 0.6 (0.57-0.64) 
when adopting the “SEER” testing method. To make the “EER” and “SEER” comparable, an 
efficiency correction of this extent is included when applying the McFadden-type discrete 
choice model in this paper. 
Table 2:  Energy efficiency standard and labelling (EES&L) schemes for RACs in China 
Model type Energy efficiency indicator 
Energy efficiency tiers 
Tier-1 Tier-2 Tier-3 
FSAC (CC ≤ 4,500 W) EER (W/W) 3.6 3.4 3.2 
FSAC (4,500 W< CC ≤ 7,100 W) EER (W/W) 3.5 3.3 3.1 
FSAC (7,100 W< CC ≤ 14,000 W) EER (W/W) 3.4 3.2 3.0 
VSAC (CC ≤ 4,500W) SEER (W/W) 5.4 5.0 4.3 
VSAC (4,500 W< CC ≤ 7,100 W) SEER (W/W) 5.1 4.4 3.9 
VSAC (7,100 W< CC ≤ 14,000 W) SEER (W/W) 4.7 4.0 3.5 
Note: CC denotes the cooling capacity. 
(Source: National standards of GB12021.3-2010 and GB21455-2013 from Energy Label, 2016) 
 
Due to the relatively small floor space of rooms, which is usually 10-30 m2 per room, mainly 
two RACs models are popularly purchased by Chinese households in terms of cooling 
capacity (CC), namely 1P model (CC=2,200-2,600W) and 1.5P model (CC=3,200-3,600W) 
(Zheng et al., 2014b). According to the “Chinese Household Energy Consumption Report” by 
the Renmin University of China (Zheng et al, 2014b), the average cooling capacity per unit 
RAC in Chinese households is about 3,160W, which is roughly the average of 1P and 1.5P 
RAC models. Additionally, the energy efficiency (EER or SEER) for 2P, 2.5P and 3P RAC 
models are generally lower than 1P and 1.5P RACs (see Table 2), and at the same time these 
are significantly more expensive. Therefore, for the calculations in this paper (i.e., Equations 
3-12), excluding 2P, 2.5P and 3P RACs might result in a slight underestimation of the most 
effective subsidy levels for RACs. This is actually a conservative (or safe) choice for our 
analysis, and should not substantially affect the findings and conclusions of this paper. 
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In this study, the average RAC retail prices were obtained from the SUNING website, which 
is one of the largest online dealers of household appliances in the Chinese market (see Table 
3). In total, the retail prices of 1,236 RAC models from thirty-eight domestic and 
international manufacturers were collected, involving 335 FSAC models (175 1P models and 
160 1.5P models) and 901 VSAC models (411 1P models and 490 1.5P models). 
Table 3: Average RAC retail prices in the Chinese market 
Model type 
(cooling capacity ≤ 4,500W) 
FSAC VSAC 
Tier-3 Tier-2 Tier-1 Tier-3 Tier-2 Tier-1 
Average retail prices[1] 
(Chinese Yuan/unit) 2,053 3,195 5,455 2,938 3,824 5,250 
Numbers of available models  288 41 6 431 255 215 
Note: [1] The prices were collected as of August 2016, and weighted by 1P and 1.5P RAC models. 
(Source: Authors’ statistics from SUNING, 2016) 
 
3.2 Space cooling demand in Chinese households  
THUBERC (2013) summarizes some surveys of the household cooling load intensity 
(MJ/m2 ·year) in different cities from all over China (see Table 4). As most Chinese 
households use their air conditioners in quite a frugal way, such as turning on RACs for a few 
hours per day in summers and only in occupied rooms, and setting higher indoor 
temperatures, the real-world cooling load intensity in China depends not only on local climate 
conditions, but more significantly on people’s use behaviors of RACs (THUBERC, 2013). As 
shown in Table 4, the household cooling load intensity varies in Chinese cities from about 
40-85 MJ/m2·year. As a comparison, the average cooling intensities in households in the U.S. 
and Hong Kong are about 173 and 215 MJ/m2·year respectively (EIA, 2013b; EMSD, 2015), 
which are 3-4 times the current average level in China. 
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Table 4: Surveyed household cooling load intensities in urban China  
Location Cooling load intensities (MJ/m2·year) Study Year 
Cities 
Wuhan 41.0 2004 
Guangzhou 85.3 2003 
Shanghai 46.4 2003 
Hangzhou 68.0 2005 
Xian 44.3 2007 
Beijing 48.6 2012 
Suzhou 54.0 2012 
Urban China-average (CN-AVE) 55 
Urban China-high (CN-HIGH) 85 
(Source: THUBERC, 2013) 
 
3.3 Household electricity price in China 
Different from the practice in many developed countries, the electricity price for households 
in China is much lower (usually 40-50% less) than that for industrial and commercial sectors. 
This implies that the electricity use in Chinese households is, to some extent, subsidized by 
the government. To promote electricity savings in the residential sector, a tiered pricing of 
electricity for households has been implemented in China since 2012, with an average rate of 
about 7.6 US cents/kWh (Zhang & Qin, 2015). Being a regulated sector, power generation in 
China receives subsidies from the government directly and indirectly in many forms, 
including tax benefits, lower cost for land use, etc. It has been surmised that the real 
electricity price might be around 2.1-2.2 times higher, namely about 16.3 US cents/kWh, if 
all types of government subsidies were removed (Jiang & Tan, 2013; Hong et al., 2013).  
China’s pledge at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) was to reduce its 
emission intensity by 40-45% in 2020 relative to 2005. Many studies indicate that China 
could achieve this target through setting a CO2 price of $30/tCO2 in 2020 (Calvin et al., 
2012a; Calvin et al., 2012b). With this proposed climate policy, results of the Asia Modeling 
Exercise (AME) (2012) estimate that China’s electricity price could increase by about 50% in 
2020 considering all models involved in the project on average. That is, China’s real 
electricity price (i.e., without government subsidies) for households under this climate policy 
($30/tCO2 in 2020) could be about 24.5 US cents/kWh, which is quite close to the current 
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electricity price in Japan, namely 26.8 US cents/kWh (the average over 2011-2014) (IEA, 
2016).  
In this paper, besides the current household electricity price (7.6 US cents/kWh) in China, 
two other prices were used to conduct a sensitivity analysis, namely the real price in China of 
16.3 US cents/kWh (i.e., after removing government subsidies), and the real electricity price 
under a certain climate policy for achieving China’s Copenhagen pledge, which is estimated 
at about 24.5 US cents/kWh. 
3.4 Consumer discount rate 
Trading-off between present benefits (or costs) and future ones has constantly been the core 
of consumer purchase decision-making (Enzler et al., 2014; Hausman J. 1979). This involves 
the weighting process of intertemporal discounting and risk preference. In many prominent 
energy-economy models such as NEMS and MARKAL, consumers’ technology choices are 
often quantitatively represented as involving a consumer subjective discount rate (also called 
individual discount rate), which is usually much higher than the market discount rate, namely 
the prevailing interest rate on loans (EIA, 2015; Kannan et al., 2007). Although there are 
arguments for applying subjective discount rates to explain consumers’ technology choices, 
this is still recognized as the most widely-used method in modeling consumers’ purchase 
decisions (Min et al., 2014; Kannan et al., 2007). 
There are two basic approaches to estimate consumer discount rates (Min et al., 2014). The 
first one is by controlled experiment (also referred as task choices or direct inquiry), while the 
second one is by applying econometric models. Wide heterogeneity in subjective discount 
rates has been found in previous studies, with rates varying by people’s socio-economic 
status, particularly income (Enzler et al., 2014; Harrison et al., 2002; Green et al., 1996; 
Hausman, 1979). Higher-income people usually weight future benefits more, implying the 
use of a lower subjective discount rate by them.  
Nonetheless, in practice, to simplify energy-economy models a population-wide subjective 
discount rate is often applied instead of income-specific discount rates (EIA, 2015; Mundaca 
& Neij, 2009; Kannan et al., 2007). Moreover, although classic economics assumes that the 
consumer discount rate represents a stable individual difference variable that “applies to all 
acts of consumption” (Frederick et al., 2002), some studies indicate that the discount rate 
relates to specific technologies as well (EIA, 2015; Min et al, 2014; Mau et al, 2008; Dreyfus 
 
 
14 
 
& Viscusi, 1995; Ruderman et al., 1987; Doane & Hartman, 1984; Hausman, 1979). Table 5 
summarizes some existing literature on consumer discount rates. 
 
Table 5: Consumer discount rates estimated or suggested by existing studies  
Models or studies Objectives/targets 
Used or estimated 
consumer discount 
rates 
Energy-
economy 
models 
NEMS 
(EIA, 2015) 
room air conditioner 42% 
central air conditioners 25% 
refrigerators 10% 
natural gas furnaces 15% 
REEPS 
(Hwang et al., 1994) 
calculating the present 
value of operating cost 40% 
MARKAL 
(Kannan et al., 2007) 
high efficiency household 
appliances (U.K.) 25% 
MARKAL 
(Ybema & Kram, 1997) 
energy efficiency 
investment decisions 
(Netherland) 
10-30% 
Population-
wide 
consumer 
discount rates 
(Harrison et al., 2002) Danish 28% 
(Enzler et al., 2014) Swiss population in two different points of year 
26.8% (2007) 
27.2% (2011) 
Specific 
equipment 
(Hausman, 1979) room air conditioners 24.1% -26.4% 
(Mau et al., 2008) 
hybrid electric vehicles 
(HEV) and hydrogen fuel 
cell vehicle (HFCV) 
21%-49% 
(Dreyfus & Viscusi, 1995) automobiles 11%-17% 
 
By reviewing previous studies on consumer discount rates, it is evident that: 1) the rates for 
RACs might be in the rage of about 20-40% (EIA, 2015; Hausman, 1979); and 2) the 
population-wide subjective discount rates might be around 30%. The population-wide 
discount rates are obtained usually from large-scale social survey data, not from controlled 
experiments on selected small-sized groups. Such controlled experiments often have a bias 
because of certain sampling issues (Enzler et al., 2014; Harrison et al., 2002). Owing to few 
studies of consumer discount rates in Chinese cases, in this paper the rate of 30% is used as 
the reference consumer discount rate for RAC choices in China. Meanwhile a lower and a 
higher rate, 20% and 40% respectively, are also tested in a sensitivity analysis. 
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3.5 Rebound effects 
The size estimates of rebound effects in household energy consumption vary among end-uses 
and different studies. For example, the IRGC (2013) estimated that direct rebound effects 
were about 5-12% for lighting, 0-50% for space cooling, and up to 40% for water heating. In 
comparison, the ACEEE (2012) reported that the average direct rebound effects for space 
cooling was about 13%, and it further stated that such effects were likely to be higher in 
moderate climates where the use of air conditioning is considered optional rather than 
mandatory. They also reported that there was a small amount of rebound in the case of 
washing machines (about 5%), and little evidence of rebound effects for water heating and 
refrigeration. In a review of different studies, the ACCEE (2012) also observed that many 
estimates of higher rebound effects were primarily based on studies of consumers’ response 
to changes in energy prices, but not to changes in energy efficiency itself. The ACEEE 
(2012) concluded that direct rebound effects in household energy use tended to be modest, 
generally 10% or less. As there are few existing studies specifically about rebound effects for 
China, considering the suggested scales by IRGC (2013) and ACEEE (2012), in this paper 
four levels of rebound effect (i.e., “φ”) for space cooling in Chinese households are examined 
for a sensitivity analysis, namely no rebound effects (0%), a low level (10%), the reference 
level (20%) and a high level (50%).  
 
4. Analysis results and discussion 
4.1 The most economic subsidy level (MESL) 
Based on Equations 3-5, the “weighted average energy efficiency of purchased RACs” in 
urban China is calculated for different subsidy levels, namely 5%-95% of the retail prices of 
Tier-1 and Tier-2 RAC models (see Figure 2). As shown in the figure, the efficiency curve is 
relatively flat at both low and high subsidy levels, but quite steep for the middle range of 
subsidy levels such as 35-65%. Along with an increase in the subsidy level, the weighted 
average COP (W/W) of the RAC stock purchased by consumers increases from about 4.17 to 
4.62, representing an efficiency gain at the level of difference between that of FSAC Tier-1 
and VSAC Tier-2 models. It can be expected that the efficiency curve will shift upward with 
the rise of electricity price and the growth of cooling load demand.  
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Note: The COP of FSACs is adjusted be comparable with that of VSACs according to the research (Xu & Liao, 
2008). 
Figure 2: Weighted average energy efficiency of purchased RACs under different subsidy 
incentives 
 
With Equations 3-12, the “net cost of subsidy per unit electricity saved” of various RAC 
subsidy incentives is also calculated (see the results in Figure 3). Figure 3 demonstrates that 
the policy cost curve is U-shaped. The lowest point on the curve represents the most 
economic subsidy level (MESL).  
With the current cooling demand intensities (CN-AVE, 55 MJ/m2·year, and CN-HIGH, 85 
MJ/m2·year) and electricity price (7.6 US cents/kWh) in Chinese urban households, the 
MESL is estimated at about 60%, considering 20% of rebound effects from the use of 
efficient RACs. It is much higher than the currently applied RAC subsidy levels of 5-15% in 
the country. The policy cost, namely net subsidies required, at the MESL is only 1.4-2.3 
USD/kWh, while it is about 7.5-16.8 USD/kWh at the current subsidy levels in Beijing (i.e., 
8-13%), roughly 5-7 times higher than the most economic level. 
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Figure 3: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different RAC subsidy 
incentives in China (EP = 7.6 US cents/kWh; DR = 30%; RB = 20%) 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In Section 2.2, it has already been mentioned that the household cooling load intensity, 
electricity price, consumer discount rate and rebound coefficient are four key exogenous 
variables that affect the cost-effectiveness analysis of RAC subsidy incentives. In this paper, 
a sensitivity analysis for these four factors is conducted (see Table 6).  
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Table 6: Summary of the exogenous variables used in sensitivity analysis 
Cooling load 
intensities 
(MJ/m2·year) 
Electricity prices 
(US cents/kWh) 
Consumer 
discount rates 
(%) 
Rebound effects 
(%) 
CN-AVE  
(China - average)  
(reference) 
55 
EP1 
(China current price)  
(reference) 
7.6 DR-20% (low level) 20 
RB-0% 
(no rebound 
effects) 
0 
 
CN-HIGH  
(China - high) 85 
EP2 
(China price after 
removing government 
subsidies) 
16.3 DR-30% (reference) 30 
RB-10% 
(low level) 
10 
 
US-AVE  
(U.S. - average) 173 EP3 
(China price under a 
certain climate policy) 
24.5 DR-40% (high level) 40 
RB-20% 
(reference) 
20 
 
HK-AVE  
(Hong Kong - 
average) 
215 RB-50% (high level) 
50 
 
Note: the exchange rate is 1 USD = 6.6 Chinese Yuan (August 2016). 
(Sources: THUBERC, 2013; EIA, 2013b; EMSD, 2015; Zhang & Qin, 2015; Jiang & Tan, 2013; 
Hong et al., 2013; Calvin et al., 2012a; Calvin et al., 2012b; AME, 2012; EIA, 2015; Hausman, 1979; 
IRGC, 2013; ACEEE, 2012) 
 
4.2.1 Cooling load intensities 
As shown in Table 6, four cooling load intensities were tested in the sensitivity analysis, 
including two from the U.S. and Hong Kong, which the urban China may reach in the near 
future with further economic development. The results of a sensitivity analysis under two 
different electricity prices, namely 7.6 US cents/kWh and 24.5 US cents/kWh, are presented 
in Figure 4 and 5 respectively.  
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Figure 4: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different cooling demand 
levels (EP = 7.6 US cents/kWh; DR = 30%; RB = 20%) 
 
 
Figure 5: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different cooling demand 
levels (EP = 24.5 US cents/kWh; DR = 30%; RB = 20%) 
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Several things can be learnt from the analysis. First, the policy cost curve quickly becomes 
flatter with an increase in household cooling demand at the lower range of subsidy levels 
(e.g., 5-30%). Second, even if Chinese cities reach the cooling demand intensities of 
developed regions like the U.S. and Hong Kong, the MESL will drop only slightly from 60% 
to 50% (see Figure 4), which is still much higher than the levels of 5-15% currently applied 
in China. Third, at the subsidy level of 10% (i.e., roughly the current Beijing level), the 
policy cost will significantly drop from 7.5-16.8 USD/kWh to about 1.0-1.7 USD/kWh if 
China’s household cooling demand were to reach the level of the U.S. or Hong Kong while 
keeping the current electricity price unchanged (see Figure 4). Finally, subsidy levels of 5-
15% become the most economic ones only when China’s household cooling load demand and 
electricity price both significantly increase, for example, with cooling demand rising to the 
level of Hong Kong and a higher electricity rate at a level likely under rigorous climate 
polices (see Figure 5).  
4.2.2 Electricity prices 
The sensitivity analysis for electricity price presents a similar trend to that of household 
cooling demand, that is, the policy cost curve becomes quite flat with an increase in 
electricity prices at the low rage of subsidy levels (e.g., 5-30%). With the current average 
cooling load intensity in Chinese households, namely 55 MJ/m2·year, the MESL will be 60%, 
55%, and 50% respectively for the three electricity prices from low to high (see Figure 6). In 
contrast, if the cooling load intensity in Chinese cities were to reach the current Hong Kong 
level (i.e., 173 MJ/m2·year), the MESL will be correspondingly lower at 50%, 35%, and 15% 
respectively (see Figure 7). In short, both China’s current household cooling demand and 
electricity price are too low to make the current RAC subsidy levels, 5-15%, the most 
economic. 
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Figure 6: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different electricity 
prices (cooling load level = CN-AVE; DR = 30%; RB = 20%) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different electricity 
prices (cooling load level = HK-AVE; DR = 30%; RB = 20%) 
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4.2.3 Consumer discount rates 
The implicit discount rate plays an important role in representing consumers’ purchase 
decisions of household appliances. In this study, based on a broad literature review (see 
Section 3.4), two consumer discount rates, namely 20% and 40%, are used for a sensitivity 
analysis along with a reference rate of 30%. The results show that with the current electricity 
price and average cooling load in Chinese households the MESL are 60%, 60% and 65% 
respectively for the three discount rates from low to high (see Figure 8). The higher the 
consumer discount rate used, the higher is the MESL as consumers weigh operating cost 
benefits from RAC efficiency gains less. 
 
 
Figure 8: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different consumer 
discount rates (cooling load level = CN-AVE; EP = 7.6 US cents/kWh; RB = 20%) 
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cost, namely the net subsidy required for one unit of electricity saved, is estimated at 27.0 
USD/kWh, 16.8 USD/kWh, 15.0 USD/kWh and 13.5 USD/kWh respectively for the four 
levels of rebound effects from high to low, assuming a subsidy level of 10%. Nonetheless, the 
scale of rebound effects has no substantial effects on the MESL.  
 
 
Figure 9: Net subsidies required for one unit of electricity saved under different rebound 
coefficients (cooling load level = CN-AVE; EP = 7.6 US cents/kWh; DR = 30%) 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The McFadden-type discrete choice model has long been used in many globally prominent 
energy-economy models, such as NEMS and MARKAL, to represent consumers purchase 
decisions of household appliances. Based on this type of consumer choice model, this paper 
explores the cost-effectiveness of subsidy incentives for room air conditioners (RACs) in 
China. Cost-effectiveness is measured by the amount of net subsidies required for one unit of 
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economic subsidy level (MESL), measured as a percentage of RAC retail prices. Given the 
current price and efficiency spectrum of RACs in the Chinese market, as well as the 
electricity price and cooling demand in Chinese households, this study estimates that the 
MESL for RACs in China should be around 60%, which is very much higher than the 
currently adopted subsidy levels of 5-15% by the Chinese governments. 
Through conducing a sensitivity analysis, it is also observed that the high MESL for RACs in 
China is mainly a consequence of the relatively low electricity price and household cooling 
demand in the country. These two factors largely determine the potential financial benefits to 
consumers from the use of efficient RACs. The household electricity price in China is only 
about one-fifth to one-third of that in some energy-efficient economies, such as Japan and 
Germany. As most Chinese households operate their RACs in quite a frugal way, for 
examples, turning on RACs for only a few hours per day in summers and for occupied rooms, 
setting a higher indoor temperature and so on, the average cooling load intensity 
(MJ/m2·year) in Chinese households is usually only about one-fourth to one-third that in the 
U.S. or Hong Kong. The sensitivity analysis shows that if China’s household cooling demand 
were to reach the current U.S. or Hong Kong level and the electricity price were to rise to the 
current Japan level, the RAC subsidy levels of 5-15% which are currently used in the country 
would be close to the most economic. 
This study also has several policy implications for designing subsidy incentives for household 
appliances (including RACs) in China. First, as the household cooling demand varies among 
regions in different climatic zones as well as at different levels of economic development, the 
RAC subsidy programs should be region-specific in order to be more cost-effective. This 
implies that subsidy polices for household appliances in developing countries (like China) 
should not be simply transferred from those in developed countries or regions, such as the EU 
and the US. Otherwise, the policy cost, namely subsidies required for one unit of electricity 
saved, might be significantly higher. de la Rue du Can et al. (2014) indicated that “there is no 
silver bullet for energy efficiency; policy must be developed on a case-by-case basis to 
respond to market barriers and must embrace local conditions.” 
Second, the method proposed for the analysis in this paper can be applied to other household 
appliances, such as refrigerators, TVs and washing machines and so on. By comparing the 
calculated policy cost curves of different appliances, the appliances to be subsidized can be 
prioritized in cost-effectiveness given the limited budgets of governments.  
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Third, there is no “one-size-fits-all” subsidy level for household appliances. The design of a 
subsidy program for a specific household appliance should be based on a comprehensive 
evaluation of the price and efficiency spectrum of that appliance’s alternatives available in 
the market, the electricity price, and household behaviors or patterns of use for that appliance, 
as that shown in Equations 3-12. In this sense, the currently-implemented household 
appliance subsidy incentives in Beijing might not be appropriate because a unified subsidy 
level was set for all types of appliances covered.  
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